Bertrand Russell Vs Cs Lewis

God and the Accomplish of Reason: C. S. Lewis, David Hume, and Bertrand Russell

Published by Cambridge University Press in 2007

pp / $ /

Having crossed paths with many well-known philosophers, such equally Gilbert Ryle, ^ane Antony Flew, ^two C. East. Yard. Joad, ³ Fredrick Copleston, ^iv Basil Mitchell, ⁵ George Grant, ⁶ and A. J. Ayer, ^vii and having written a few fairly impressive philosophical books, such as The Abolitionism of Man and Miracles, one would have thought that C. Southward. Lewis would have received his due as a philosopher long agone. But only over the past five years or so has this happened. To brainstorm with, at that place was Victor Reppert'due south C. S. Lewis'due south Dangerous Idea (2003), which was followed afterward by French philosopher Iréne Fernandez'southward C. S. Lewis – Mythe, Raison Ardente (2005) and Gregory Bassham and Jerry L. Walls' The Chronicles of Narnia and Philosophy: TheLion, the Witch, and the Worldview (2005). After these came the third volume of Bruce Edwards' C. S. Lewis: Life, Works and Legacy;Apologist, Philosopher, & Theologian (2007) and the reissued, revised edition of John Beversluis' C. S. Lewis and the Search for Rational Faith (2007). Finally, in 2008, we have seen the publication of more books on Lewis and philosophy than ever before: David Baggett, Gary Habermas and Jerry Walls' C. S. Lewis every bit Philosopher, my ain C. Southward. Lewis and Philosophy as a Way of Life: A Comprehensive Historical Exam of His Philosophical Thoughts, and Erik Wielenberg's God and the Reach of Reason: C. Due south. Lewis, David Hume and Bertrand Russell – the book I want to concentrate on in this review.

God and the Reach of Reason is Wielenberg's second book, and, as in his first book, Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe, Wielenberg proves himself again to be a clear writer and an honest intellectual, who, despite disagreeing with most of C. S. Lewis' philosophy, treats Lewis (and his other interlocutors, Hume and Russell) with respect, unlike John Beverslusis, the author of the other major book that deals with, and rejects, Lewis' philosophy. Although God and the Achieve of Reason is in principle focused on Lewis', Hume'due south and Russell'southward philosophy of religion, Wielenberg himself admits that he is more than concerned with Lewis' philosophy than anything else (6).

The book itself is divided into four principal chapters, which hash out 1) the problem of evil,ii) three arguments for the being of God, 3) miracles and the Trilemma, and four) the relationship between faith and reason, the argument from design, the relationship between church and state, and then on. While it is impossible to get into any peachy particular here, I would similar to comment on each of these chapters briefly.

In Chapter 1, Wielenberg does a practiced job explaining what the trouble of evil is, and so demonstrates a decent knowledge of Lewis' thoughts on this thing. However, ultimately Wielenberg rejects Lewis' argument – non to mention a supplemented Lewisian statement – because he thinks that neither Lewis nor any Christian can account adequately for what he calls "non-victim improving natural child suffering" (53). While I admire the seriousness that Wielenberg conveys in his examination of this problem, I think he fails to appreciate how a number of Christians, including Lewis, take understood "natural" evil. That is, the "natural" evil that many innocent children endure, such as a illness or a seismic sea wave, often has been understood as the outcome of complimentary actions past higher spirits. Thus, as Lewis pointed out in The Problem of Pain, if God were to overrule all such free actions – even when great evil is the result (every bit in the example of the non-victim improving suffering of the child) – He would essentially exist negating His greatest cosmos: free volition. Of grade, it is true that God can, and does, overrule some such deportment, merely for Him to do this all the fourth dimension would be for Him to act against the very purpose of His creating in the first identify: to make persons who choose to follow Him out of their own free wills. Consequently, without thwarting His own design, God cannot finish all such evil. And too, who is to say that God will not give children who suffer and die without any moral betterment another take chances – in a different way – to love Him freely?

In Affiliate 2, Wielenberg examines three arguments for the existence of God: the moral argument, the argument from reason, and the argument from desire. Wielenberg'south word of the moral statement is the least convincing section of the book for a number of reasons. Offset, citing Lewis' early diary, Wielenberg claims that information technology is possible to pursue evil for its own sake (72). However, while information technology is true that the early Lewis – to be specific, Lewis during his third philosophical phase – stoical materialism – rejected eudaimonism, after the Oxford don came to run across that all gratis-willed creatures pursue their own happiness (i.east. the adept equally they see it) necessarily, even if most of them mistake the real object of their happiness or expert. Hence, I agree with the mature Lewis against Wielenberg that it is an "absurd fancy" to imagine that "devils are engaged in the disinterested pursuit of something chosen Evil." ^eight Second, as an extension of his argument in Value and Virtue in a Godless Universe, Wielenberg argues confronting Lewis, saying that metaphysical naturalism is not inconsistent with the being of objective moral values (87). His merits is that objective moral values are the same equally logical truths and that somehow evolution has brought us into contact with these (which Wielenberg claims simply be simply does not give us any explanation of their ontological status in regard to naturalism). Needless to say, information technology is hither that I find Wielenberg's statement sorely lacking, and experience that for all his honesty, Wielenberg misjudges the show that Lewis presents in his moral argument.

Wielenberg's word of the argument from reason and the argument from want are better, but in both cases I accept a few complaints. Offset, in his give-and-take of the argument from reason, he does not spend virtually enough fourth dimension grappling with Victor Reppert's volume and numerous articles on this issue. As a result, I could not help only feel that Wielenberg'southward thoughts on this matter were incomplete and tentative at best; moreover, while Wielenberg admits that the statement from reason, which he says is an argument claiming that metaphysical naturalism cannot business relationship for intentionality, is a problem for naturalism, he has faith (blind faith?) that one day naturalism will be able to account for this and he says that naturalism'due south organized religion in this regard is the aforementioned equally Christianity'south faith in regard to the existence of evil (108). Yet, as I have pointed out, I do not agree with Wielenberg that Christianity cannot account for evil in a disarming way, and and then I practice not recollect that Wielenberg's neutralization statement works. 2nd, while I agree with Wielenberg when he claims that all people have an innate desire for something which lies beyond the natural globe (this being the first premise in the argument from desire), I find it odd that he could acknowledge this so deny that such innate, natural desires can be satisfied (119). Hence, once again I feel that his powers of judgment are not every bit sharp as they could be, for he says that the testify for God's beingness and life'south absurdity is the same in this regard.

In Affiliate 3, Wielenberg discusses both miracles and the Trilemma. While he rightly points out a few small problems with how Lewis formulated his argument for miracles, Wielenberg'southward rejection of Lewis' argument for miracles depends largely on his prior rejection of Lewis' statement from reason, which I do non think Wielenberg dealt with adequately (136). While Wielenberg thinks that those who argue for miracles need to business relationship for the uniformity of nature and the probability principle, information technology is precisely those who argue confronting miracles who need to account for these since if there is neither uniformity nor a standard by which probability can exist measured, then a miracle is quite literally no stranger than anything else and hence it is ridiculous to fence against miracles. Finally, while I agree with Wielenberg that the Trilemma – that Jesus was either liar, lunatic or Lord – is a weak argument, I find it somewhat annoying (and here I am probably but beingness pedantic) when people refer to it continuously as "Lewis's famous Trilemma," for it was G. One thousand. Chesterton, and non C. Due south. Lewis, who formulated this argument originally (149).

Finally, in Affiliate 4, Wielenberg discusses a handful of different bug, including the relationship betwixt faith and reason, the argument from design, the relationship between church building and country, and so on. In regard to organized religion and reason, Wielenberg gets Lewis correct when he says that the Oxford don was a qualified evidentialist (164). Nevertheless, I would have liked a much deeper give-and-take of Lewis' different types of faith (faith as trusting what you know is almost probable and faith every bit a gift) and likewise how these relate to the deliberative imagination, which is the source of mythical inspiration according to Lewis. As for the statement from blueprint, Wielenberg is again correct when he points out that Lewis found this statement wanting (182). Withal, instead of moving on to the next issue speedily, Wielenberg should have pointed out that when Lewis rejected this argument – in the 1950s – it was a weak statement, but present it is perhaps the most powerful statement for the beingness of God as witnessed past the contempo theistic/deistic conversion of the great atheistic philosopher Antony Flew. ^nine Lastly, in regard to the relationship between church and land, Wielenberg points out (over again rightly) that Lewis disapproved of a potent connection betwixt church and state (200). Yet, like most Lewis scholars, Wielenberg does not give usa a articulate thought of how all of Lewis' political views can be reconciled. On my account nosotros may sum upward his views as follows: on the one hand, Lewis loved and valued ontological hierarchy with its proportionate equality and rich mythical meaning; however, on the other hand, he was skeptical of the abuses that came with such on a political level, given the fallen nature of human being. Thus, Lewis' entire political agenda was to navigate betwixt these two factors. His solution was something like a democratic or even a quasi-socialist system which would maintain its formalism monarchy to attend the people spiritually, and whose rulers would seek to draw out the unique essence of the nation but would do so with prudence, backbone, temperance and justice mixed with mercy.

In conclusion, even though I disagree with near of Wielenberg's opinions and find his knowledge of Lewis wanting in some places, God and the Reach of Reason is an attainable book, which is conspicuously written and easy to follow, and then I would recommend it to those interested in natural theology and especially those interested in Lewis and philosophy. Incidentally, with so many books about Lewis and philosophy being published at the moment, some might wonder what the major differences are between these. While my own book, C. S.Lewis and Philosophy equally a Style of Life, is concerned largely with tracing the history of Lewis' philosophical development over the entire grade of his life and and so discussing these developments in regard to the diverse branches of philosophy, such as metaphysics, epistemology and then on, well-nigh of the other books, including C. Due south. Lewis's Dangerous Idea, C. South. Lewis as Philosopher and, of course, God and the Reach of Reason, have to do with Lewis' specifically-Christian views on various issues in the philosophy of faith.

Cite this article

Adam Barkman, "God and the Reach of Reason: C.S. Lewis, David Hume, and Bertrand Russell", Christian Scholar'southward Review, 38:1 , 160-163

Footnotes

John Mabbott, Oxford Memories (Oxford: Thornton's, 1986), 77-8.
Antony Flew, There is a God: How the World's Almost Notorious Atheist Changed His Mind (New York: HarperOne,2007), 22-three.
Christopher W. Mitchell, "University Battles: C. S. Lewis and the Oxford University Socratic Club," in C.S. Lewis: Lightbearer in the Shadowlands; The Evangelistic Vision of C. S. Lewis, ed. Angus J. L. Menuge (Wheaton:Crossway Books, 1997), 329-52.
Walter Hooper, "Oxford's Bonny Fighter," in C. Southward. Lewis at the Breakfast Tabular array and Other Reminiscences, ed.James Como (San Diego: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1992), 180.
Basil Mitchell and Andrew Walker, "Reflections on C. Due south. Lewis, Apologetics, and the Moral Tradition," inRumours of Heaven: Essays in Celebration of C. S. Lewis, ed. Andrew Walker and James Patrick (London:Hawkeye, 1998), 7-26.
Ron Dart, "C. South. Lewis and George Grant: A Tale of 2 Anglican Tories," Pilgrimage: The Toronto C. Due south.Lewis Guild Message 9.2 (Apr 2002): ane.
A. J. Ayer, Role of My Life: Memoirs of a Philosopher (London: Harcourt Caryatid Jovanovich, 1977), 96-7.
C. S. Lewis, The Screwtape Letters, in C. S. Lewis: Selected Books (London: HarperCollins, 1999), 737.
Antony Flew and Gary Habermas, "My Pilgrimage from Disbelief to Theism: A Word between AntonyFlew and Gary Habermas," Philosophia Christi half-dozen.ii (2004): 198.